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209

52

Action

SS

Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 1962

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT, ALL OTHERS FOR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578

FOLLOWING DETAILED REPORT SPECIAL NAC MEETING 1000 28TH
(HIGHLIGHTS POLTO 512).

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL (COLONNA) OPENED MEETING BY
ANNOUNCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED FOR SPECIAL
MEETING IN ORDER INFORM NAC LATEST CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS.

US THEN OPENED REMARKS BY EMPHASIZING SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION
AND NEED TO GET SOONEST REACTION NATO GOVERNMENTS TO VARIOUS
POINTS THAT WE WOULD RAISE AND ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN AS
OUTLINED REFTELS. HE STATED THAT WHILE REALIZED MOST
PERM REPS COULD NOT GIVE AGREED GOVERNMENT POSITIONS,
HE HOPED THEY WOULD INDICATE AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE THEIR
PERSONAL REACTIONS AND WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEIR GOVERNMENTS'
REACTIONS WOULD BE. US THEN PARAPHRASED GENERAL US EVALU-
ATION SOVIET POLICY CONTAINED CIRC 744. THEN READ AND
DISTRIBUTED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT CONTAINED CIRC 788.
HE FOLLOWED THIS WITH GIST TOPOL 578 CONTAINING BRIEFING
PRESIDENT DESIRED BE GIVEN NAC. AFTER GIVING GIST PARA 4
THIS TELEGRAM HE GAVE GIST TYLER-HILSMAN-NITZE BRIEFING
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS CONTAINED TOPOL 574 BEFORE FINISHING
REST OF MATERIAL CONTAINED TOPOL 578. WE ALSO DISTRIBUTED
AT MEETING WIRELESS BULLETIN OCTOBER 28 CONTAINING AMONG
OTHER THINGS TEXT PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV 27TH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR.

SECRET

BELGIAN

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REVIEWED BY

DATE 3/30/88

() ENCLASSE () DECLASSIFY
() EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DELIN () Non-responsive info.

POL 112 OF 112 EXEMPTING

To authority to:

() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () LC, OADR

SECRET

-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM PARIS

BELGIAN OPENED QUESTIONING BY ASKING WHETHER PRESIDENT HAD FLATLY REJECTED CUBAN-TURKISH DEAL WITHOUT LEAVING DOOR OPEN FOR SOME LATER NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION AND STUDY WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, IT AGREED US POSITION CALLED FOR LIQUIDATION OFFENSIVE MISSILE BASES CUBA BEFORE ANY OTHER MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED OR NEGOTIATED WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE GENERAL SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT.

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b)(1) BIA3

TALK OCTOBER 25 WITH SOVIET CHARGE IN WHICH LATTER EXPRESSED [] WOULD USE INFLUENCE PREVENT MATTERS GOING OVER BRINK, TO WHICH [] REPLIED SOVIET ACTION IN CUBA HAD UPSET BALANCE AND THIS MUST BE REDRESSED, AND STATED IN REPLY TO SOVIET QUESTION REGARDING QUARANTINE THAT ANY COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE AS BEST IT SAW FIT. [] IN VIEW OF THIS OBVIOUS POWER PLAY IN CUBA, DESPITE ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, IT MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR [] TO WORK WITH SOVIET UNION WHEN THEY DID NOT TELL THE TRUTH. (b)(1) BIA3

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-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

[] REITERATED FIRST INGREDIENT WAS TO GET RID OF THE WEAPONS IN CUBA, AFTER WHICH IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE AND WORK OUT OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS IN OTHER FIELDS IN ORDER TO LESSEN TENSION IF POSSIBLE AND PUT NATO IN BEST DEFENSIVE POSITION. HE IMPLIED WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS HE HAD IN MIND WORKING OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT TO REPLACE JUPITERS BY MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS. (HE HAD VOLUNTEERED RPT VOLUNTEERED TO ME PREVIOUSLY THAT HE HAD IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF SETTING UP A NATO MULTILATERAL FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO REPLACE OBSOLETE JUPITERS IN BOTH TURKEY AND ITALY.) US ASSURED [] THAT WE NOT OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER FIELDS AS WELL AS DISARMAMENT, AND PARTICULARLY NOT OPPOSED TO STRENGTHEN NATO DEFENSES PROVIDED CUBAN MATTER SETTLED SATISFACTORILY.

[] STATED HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE UNITED STATES POSITION RE CUBA GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY THAT WE MUST GET RID OF THE WEAPONS BEFORE ANY OTHER SETTLEMENT OR ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE. HE ADDED HOWEVER IT WAS GRATIFYING TO LEARN THAT US DID NOT OPPOSE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE THREAT AND BLACKMAIL HAD CEASED. UNDER INSTRUCTIONS HE URGED THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND AVOID IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE DIRECT ACTION BY USE OF FORCE WHICH MIGHT MEAN THAT MATTERS WOULD GET COMPLETELY OUT OF HAND.

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-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

HE ADDED WHILE HE SURE HIS GOVT DESIRED EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS
WITH SOVIETS THEY SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE IN ANY
WAY ANYTHING THAT MIGHT LOOK LIKE APPEASEMENT.

AFTER [] HAD MADE A STATEMENT INDICATING SOLIDARITY
WITH US, THE [] STATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INS-
TRUCTIONS HE SURE HIS GOVERNMENT TOOK SIMILAR POSITION TO
THAT OF [] AND UNDERLINED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD OF
COURSE, DO EVERYTHING TO UNDERLINE THE DETERRENT. HE ADDED
DETERRENT MEANS TO AVOID WAR, AND THEREFORE HOPED THAT
EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES FROM BREAKING
OUT, SINCE HE FEARED WEST NOT NOW READY FOR MAJOR
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. [] THEN ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE AS TO STATE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
PINPOINT BOMBING OF ACTUAL SOVIET BASES IN CUBA AND ACTUAL IN-
VASION OF ISLAND TO LIQUIDATE THESE BASES. NO ONE TRIED TO
ANSWER HIS QUESTION.

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW.

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52

EYES ONLY**SECRET**Action
SSControl: 19528
Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1962
5:44 PM

Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11)

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT, ALL OTHERS FOR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578

[] STATED HAD RECEIVED NEW MESSAGES WHICH CONTAINED HIS GOVT'S EVALUATION SOVIET MOVES AND COMMENTS [] EVALUATION WHICH [] PROCEEDED TO READ TO COUNCIL. (ASSUME DEPARTMENT HAS BOTH) PRESUMABLY THOSE REFERRED TO IN TOPOL 581).

[] AGAIN EXPRESSING FULL SOLIDARITY WITH US ACTION, EXPRESSED FEAR THAT CUBA AND BERLIN MIGHT BE MORE FIRMLY LINKED IN NEAR FUTURE. THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE SLOW-DOWN IN CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TO BERLIN, BUT WHETHER THIS DELIBERATE AND FULLY CONNECTED WITH CUBA NOT CLEAR. IN ANY EVENT, HE URGED THAT NO MATTER WHAT SMALL OR LARGE HARRASSMENTS MIGHT TAKE PLACE, THEY SHOULD BE RESISTED MOST FIRMLY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES UNTIL CUBAN MATTER SETTLED.

[] THEN MADE STRONG STATEMENT FAVORING US ACTION UNDER-
LINING JUPITERS ARE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR THE DEFENSE NOT JUST OF TURKEY BUT FOR ALL OF NATO, AND THEREFORE
(A) WE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON ANY POINTS UNTIL SOVIET MISSILES CUBA COMPLETELY LIQUIDATED, AND (B) PRESIDENT HAS BEEN COMPLETELY RIGHT IN TURNING DOWN ANY DEAL. [] THEN OUTLINED CONVERSATION [] AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR [] IN WHICH LATTER TOOK [] TO TASK FOR FIRM PRO-US POSITION

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-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

WHICH COULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR [] IF PERSISTED IN.
[] REPLIED FIRMLY [] WOULD STAND BY HER ALLIANCE
COMMITMENTS AND HER PRINCIPLES. [] PERMREP AGAIN URGED
NATO SOLIDARITY STATEMENT RE CUBA.

[] (AFTER FIRST HAVING TOLD US HE WAS CHECKING WITH []
STATED [] BACKS US MOVES 100 PERCENT, PARTICULARLY ON
PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL MAKE ANY DEAL RE JUPITERS. HE POINTED
OUT IF DEAL MADE ON JUPITERS SOVIETS MIGHT ATTEMPT ESTABLISH
BASES OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEN FORCE DEALS FOR LIQUIDATION
OTHER NATO INSTALLATIONS WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY COMPLETELY
BREAK UP ALLIANCE. HE ADDED WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT
ALWAYS FULLY SHARE OUR ACTIONS IN TRYING TO DISCUSS
MATTERS WITH SOVIETS, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT WE WERE RIGHT IN
REFUSING NEGOTIATE NOW UNTIL CUBAN MISSILE BASES FULLY
LIQUIDATED. PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT IF CUBAN MATTER COULD BE
SATISFACTORILY LIQUIDATED AND IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO KHRUSHCHEV
HIS COUP HAD FAILED AND WEST WAS SOLIDLY AGAINST HIS MOVES
OF THIS KIND, IT MIGHT THEN BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO START NEGOTIATING
WITH A SOMEWHAT CHASTENED KHRUSHCHEV.

[] SPEAKING PERSONALLY, STATED HE WAS CERTAIN HIS GOVT
WOULD AGREE WITH PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL ANY DEAL RE JUPITERS.
HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THIS NAC MEETING WAS FOR INFORMATION OR
CONSULTATION, SINCE US STATEMENTS HAD EMPHASIZED WE HOPED
TO SETTLE CUBAN MATTER IN CONTEXT WESTERN HEMISPHERE. US
REPLIED WHILE THE PROBLEM WAS BASICALLY ONE OF WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, AND THEREFORE WE WOULD RELY BASICALLY ON OUR
OAS ALLIES, IT CLEAR ANY ACTION IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
INVOLVING ONE NATO PARTNER DOES AFFECT ENTIRE NATO ALLIANCE.
PARTICULARLY TRUE NOW THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD LINKED CUBA AND
JUPITERS IN TURKEY. THEREFORE, THE US NOT ONLY WISHED
TO GIVE ALLIANCE INFORMATION REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS, BUT
DESIRED TO HAVE SUPPORT OF THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN,
PARTICULARLY IN TURNING DOWN JUPITER DEAL.

[] INTERJECTED THAT HIS GOVT DEFINITELY DESIRED THAT
CONSULTATIONS IN FULLEST MEANING OF THE WORD SHOULD CONTINUE.

[DURING]

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-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM:
PARIS

DURING THIS ENTIRE CRISIS BECAUSE DEVELOPMENTS COULD TAKE PLACE WHICH VITALLY AFFECT ENTIRE ALLIANCE.

[] REITERATING HIS GOVT'S STRONG APPROVAL US ACTION CUBA, STATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, HE SURE HIS GOVT WOULD BACK OUR ACTION ON JUPITERS, SINCE THESE ARE NATO WEAPONS AND ANY ACTION TO REMOVE THEM, REPLACE THEM, OR MAKE ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS TO COVER THE SAME DEFENSE NEEDS MUST BE PASSED BY NATO AS A WHOLE. HE THEN STATED HE IMPRESSED BY [] COLLEAGUE'S STATEMENT AND HOPED ALL EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO AVOID USE OF FORCE. HOWEVER, SINCE IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE AVOID USE OF FORCE, NAC CONSULTATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE CONTINUOUSLY. [] THEN EMPHASIZED WHILE HE AGREED WITH OTHERS WE MIGHT INTENSIFY DISCUSSIONS DISARMAMENT AFTER CUBAN MATTER SETTLED, SHOULD NOT SHOW MORE DESIRE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN DISARMAMENT AFTER CUBA SETTLED BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION TO KHRUSHCHEV HE HAD MADE GAIN BY CREATING CUBAN CRISIS.

[] SAID HE HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS IN REGARD TO THIS MEETING, BUT HIS FONOFF HAD INFORMED THE UNITED STATES GOVT IT BACKED FULLY US ACTION RE CUBA. [] WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT REITERATED HIS GOVT'S FIRM PUBLIC STAND FOR US.

[] THIS UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S MEETING WAS (1) TO GET CONSENSUS COUNCIL ON ACTION TAKEN BY US ON CUBA PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO JUPITERS; (2) TO KEEP NAC INFORMED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF DEVELOPMENTS, AND (3) TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO FORECAST FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER THAT NAC MIGHT BE PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES.

[] THEN BROUGHT UP FACT THAT THERE WERE MANY RUMORS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PLANNING UNILATERAL BOMBARDMENT OF CUBA WITHOUT ANY WARNING, CONSULTATION WITH NAC OR WITH UN. US REPLIED COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS MATTER, SINCE SUCH DECISION MIGHT BE GOVERNED PRIMARILY BY MILITARY QUESTION, BUT STATED WE WOULD TRY TO CONSULT WHENEVER WE COULD, BUT ONE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THIS WOULD ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE.

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-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM:
PARIS

THEN INTERJECTED TO
STATE THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION OF IMPORTANT
MILITARY BUILD-UP IN BULGARIA AND THOUGHT THIS SHOULD BE
BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL BECAUSE IT MIGHT
INDICATE A PLAN OF SOVIET BLOC DIVERSION.

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

1. THERE WAS A FULL NAC CONSENSUS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE
SOVIET MENACE AND THREAT BY PLACING OFFENSIVE MISSILES
CUBA AND FULL SUPPORT FOR US POSITION.
2. ALL AGREED IT MOST HELPFUL HAVE FULL OAS SUPPORT FOR US
ACTION.
3. ALL AGREED THAT NO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL
CUBAN BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED.
4. ALL ARE IN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT AGAINST ANY TRADE RE JUPITERS.
5. ALL AGREED THAT SOVIET UNION MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE
MUST DROP CUBAN MISSILE VENTURE BEFORE WEST CAN START MEANING-
FUL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IF CUBA SETTLED.
6. ALL NAC MEMBERS WISHED TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACT
AND MEET AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ASSURE COLLECTIVE
BACKING OF ALL NAC MEMBERS FOR ACTION TAKEN IN THIS CRISIS.

WHILE

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-5- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11),
PARIS

WHILE COLONNA DID NOT EMPHASIZE IN HIS SUMMARY, IT WAS MOST
CLEAR DESIRE OF PERMREPS THAT ONCE CUBA PROBLEM SETTLED
SATISFACTORILY, THERE SHOULD BE FIRM EFFORTS BY WEST FOR
GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR PROBLEMS.

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW

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-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

BELGIAN OPENED QUESTIONING BY ASKING WHETHER PRESIDENT
HAD FLATLY REJECTED CUBAN-TURKISH DEAL WITHOUT LEAVING DOOR
OPEN FOR SOME LATER NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION
AND STUDY WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, IT AGREED US POSITION
CALLED FOR LIQUIDATION OFFENSIVE MISSILE BASES CUBA BEFORE
ANY OTHER MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED OR NEGOTIATED WITHIN
OR OUTSIDE THE GENERAL SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT.

CANADA THEN READ HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DIEFENBAKER STATEMENT
OF OCTOBER 25 BACKING US POSITION [

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(b)(1)
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-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM. (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

(6)(1)
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SECRET

SECRET

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM:
PARIS

1676
BIA3

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

1. THERE WAS A FULL NAC CONSENSUS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MENACE AND THREAT BY PLACING OFFENSIVE MISSILES CUBA AND FULL SUPPORT FOR US POSITION.
2. ALL AGREED IT MOST HELPFUL HAVE FULL OAS SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.
3. ALL AGREED THAT NO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL CUBAN BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED.
4. ALL ARE IN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT AGAINST ANY TRADE RE JUPITERS.
5. ALL AGREED THAT SOVIET UNION MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE MUST DROP CUBAN MISSILE VENTURE BEFORE WEST CAN START MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IF CUBA SETTLED.
6. ALL NAC MEMBERS WISHED TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACT AND MEET AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ASSURE COLLECTIVE BACKING OF ALL NAC MEMBERS FOR ACTION TAKEN IN THIS CRISIS.

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-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM
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-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM:
PARIS

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-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION I OF II), FROM
PARIS

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(b)(1)

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-5- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 26, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

WHILE COLONNA DID NOT EMPHASIZE IN HIS SUMMARY, IT WAS MOST
CLEAR DESIRE OF PERMREPS THAT ONCE CUBA PROBLEM SETTLED
SATISFACTORILY, THERE SHOULD BE FIRM EFFORTS BY WEST FOR
GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR PROBLEMS.

FINLETTER

MJA

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